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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Amber Rae Round appeals from her judgment of conviction. On appeal, she 
argues that the district court erred by denying her suppression motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The parties do not dispute the central facts of this case. As found by the district 
court in its order denying Round's suppression motion: 
On the evening of August 10, 2009, Officer Montoya and Detective Holtry 
assisted other officers in the detention and arrest of an individual named 
Alfredo Ybarra for possession of ten ounces of methamphetamine. One of 
the vehicles involved was a white Ford Explorer which was parked in a lot 
by the Boise Little Theater in Boise City, Ada County, Idaho. A drug 
detection dog alerted on this vehicle and a search revealed a baggy of 
methamphetamine and a gun and clip. Officer Montoya contacted 
Detective Christensen concerning the Explorer somewhere between 3:00 
and 4:00 a.m. on the morning of August 11, 2009. Because the officers 
involved were not sure what action to take, it was left there overnight. 
Later in the morning of August 11, between 7: 10 and 7:15 a.m., Detectives 
Holtry and Christensen checked on the Explorer. A black Nissan Exterra 
was about ten to fifteen feet away from the Explorer and a person 
Detective Holtry recognized from contact the previous evening as Michael 
Stolp was reaching inside the Explorer. Detective Holtry approached 
Michael Stolp and Detective Christensen drove after the Exterra which 
had headed down the alley. Detective Holtry called for the assistance of 
uniformed officers and a drug detection dog. Detective Christensen 
initiated a traffic stop to determine the involvement of the driver of the 
Exterra with the Explorer and Michael Stolp. Detective Christensen 
recognized the driver as Defendant Amber Rae Round with whom he had 
previously had contact. About a month earlier, she had been frequenting 
a place where methamphetamine was being used and he had learned that 
she was involved in using methamphetamine and, perhaps, providing it to 
others. Detective Christensen approached the Exterra and noted that 
Defendant appeared nervous and agitated. He estimated contacting 
Defendant about 7: 15 a.m. He discussed his concerns regarding the 
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Explorer and Defendant's proximity to it and Defendant responded she 
was just dropping someone off. Michael Stolp told Detective Holtry he 
was there to pick up the Explorer and Defendant had given him a ride. 
Detective Holtry relayed this information to Detective Christensen. 
Nonetheless, given Defendant's demeanor and his previous experience 
with her, Detective Christensen felt she had drugs in her vehicle. He 
asked for Defendant's consent to search the Exterra and she initially 
refused. Detective Christensen then explained to Defendant his reasons 
for asking permission to search. At that point, Defendant said she wanted 
to call her attorney, D. C. Carr, and Detective Christensen allowed her to 
do so. There is some question as to whether Defendant had previously 
exited her vehicle at the direction of Detective Christensen or did so when 
she was told she could contact Mr. Carr. Nonetheless, she moved a short 
distance away from Detective Christensen to speak with her attorney on 
her cell phone. This was sometime around 7: 15 to 7:20 a.m. Defendant 
spoke with Mr. Carr somewhere between five to ten minutes. She then 
handed the phone to Detective Christensen indicating that her attorney 
wanted to speak with him. Detective Christensen spoke with Mr. Carr for 
two to three minutes. While Defendant was still on the phone with her 
attorney, Ada County Sheriffs Deputy Aaron Teall arrived with his drug 
detection dog, Nate. Deputy Teall was directed to deploy Nate. They 
went around the Exterra and, on the first pass, Nate alerted on the driver's 
side of the vehicle. Deputy Teall then searched the vehicle and found the 
suspected methamphetamine. Detective Christensen estimated the entire 
time of his contact with Defendant was fifteen to twenty minutes from the 
stop of Defendant's vehicle to her arrest for possession of the 
methamphetam ine. 
(R., pp.147-49.) 
The state charged Round with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.33-34.) 
Round filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the theory that it was obtained in 
violation of her constitutional rights. (R., pp.52-53.) The state responded to Round's 
suppression motion (R., pp.99-108), and the district court held a hearing on the matter 
(See 2/22/2010 Tr.). After the hearing, the district court denied Round's suppression 
motion. (R., pp.147-52.) 
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Round went to trial. (See 9/13-14/2010 Tr.) At the conclusion of the trial, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict on the possession charge. (R., p.220.) The district court 
entered judgment and imposed a unified sentence of seven years with two years fixed, 
but retained jurisdiction and recommended the therapeutic community. (R., pp.252-55.) 
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Round on probation 
for seven years. (R., pp.261-64.) Round timely appealed from the order placing her on 
probation. (R., pp.267-69.) 
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ISSUE 
Round states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Round's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 




Round Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Denial Of Her Suppression 
Motion 
A. Introduction 
Round argues that the district court erred by denying her suppression motion, 
asserting that officers unlawfully expanded the scope of their investigation and/or 
unlawfully extended the duration of the stop. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-16.) Application of 
the relevant legal standards to the facts found by the district court shows no error in the 
district court's denial of Round's suppression motion. The district court's order denying 
that motion should be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises 
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have 
been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 
P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. 
App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the 
trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State 
v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 
C. The District Court Properly Denied Round's Suppression Motion 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A 
traffic stop is an investigative detention subject to Fourth Amendment requirements and 
is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 
1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). "An investigative detention is permissible if it is based 
upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has 
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 
P.3d at 1223 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 
(1981)). An investigative detention must not only be justified at its beginning, but must 
be conducted in a manner that is reasonably related in scope and duration to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 
2004). "There is no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has lasted longer 
than necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention and the law 
enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop." State v. 
Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008). 
A drug-detection dog's sniff of the outside of an automobile need not be justified 
by suspicion of drug activity because it is not a "search" that implicates a privacy 
interest. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 
436, 442, 34 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Ct. App. 2001 ). However, "[w]hen a reliable drug-
detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of 
controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are drugs in 
the automobile and may search it without a warrant." State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 
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871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 
227, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005)). 
On appeal, Round correctly concedes that her initial seizure was supported by 
reasonable suspicion. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) On August 11, 2009, between 3:00 and 
4:00 a.m., patrol officers investigated a narcotics crime that involved a white Ford 
Explorer which was left parked near the Boise Little Theater. (2/22/201 O Tr., p.13, L.5 -
p.16, L.2; p.17, L.22 - p.18, L.10; p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.15.) A drug-detection dog 
performed an open-air sniff on the outside of the vehicle and alerted to the presence of 
narcotics inside the vehicle. (2/22/2010 Tr., p.16, Ls.3-7.) Upon searching the vehicle, 
officers found a .45 Smith and Wesson handgun with two ammunition clips and a baggy 
ofmethamphetamine. (2/22/2010Tr., p.16, L.8-p.17, L.1; R., p.148.) 
To determine whether the vehicle was subject to forfeiture, the patrol officers 
contacted narcotics detectives. (2/22/2010 Tr., p.17, L.2 - p.19, L.5.) When narcotics 
detectives Christensen and Holtry arrived on the scene a couple hours later, they found 
Round dropping off a person of interest from the previous night's narcotics investigation 
at the Ford Explorer. (2/22/2010 Tr., p.24, Ls.2-16; p.27, L.10 - p.28, L.18.) Once 
Round noticed the police, she fled. (2/22/2010 Tr., p.28, L.19 - p.29, L.1.) Round's 
potential connection to the Explorer and her flight from the scene provided officers with 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, allowing them to further investigate her. Illinois 
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000). 
Officer Christensen pulled over Round and during subsequent questioning he 
requested permission to search her vehicle, explaining his concerns to her. (2/22/2010 
Tr., p.40, Ls.15-20.) Round did not give Officer Christensen her permission to search 
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the vehicle, nor did she affirmatively decline it; rather, Round asked to call her attorney. 
(2/22/201 O Tr., p.40, L.10 - p.41, L.7.) During her phone call with her attorney, a K-9 
unit arrived on the scene and a drug-detection dog was deployed around the outside of 
Round's vehicle. (2/20/2010 Tr., p.63, L.8 - p.64, L.6.) Performing an open-air sniff, 
the dog indicated that narcotics were present near the driver-side, rear passenger door. 
(2/20/201 O Tr., p.45, Ls.15-22; p.62, Ls.14-17.) Police opened the door and, during a 
subsequent search of the vehicle's interior, found methamphetamine. (2/20/2010 Tr., 
p.62, L.18 - p.63, L.4.) 
On appeal, Round argues that officers unlawfully expanded the scope of their 
investigation, asserting that "Detective Christensen shifted his investigation from 
determining Ms. Round's connection to the Explorer, to an investigation into whether 
Ms. Round presently possessed drugs." (Appellant's brief, p.12 (emphasis omitted).) 
Round's contention is not supported by the facts. This was not a traffic stop to write a 
routine traffic citation that morphed into a narcotics investigation; this was a narcotics 
investigation from its inception that involved the seizure of a person observed leaving 
the scene of the crime. (R., p.150; see also 2/22/2010 Tr., p.28, L.19 - p.29, L.4; p.37, 
Ls.1-20.) At no point did officers unlawfully expand the scope of that investigation. 
Round also argues on appeal that officers unlawfully extended the duration of her 
detention, asserting that the district court erred by finding that, if anything extended her 
detention, it was Round's phone call to her attorney. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) This 
claim, too, is unsupported by the facts. Officer Christensen, investigating the narcotics 
crime, requested consent to search Round's vehicle. (2/22/2010 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-20.) 
Round responded to Officer Christensen's request by asking to speak to her lawyer. 
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(2/22/2010 Tr., p.40, L.10 - p.41, L.7.) Before the phone call with the lawyer was 
finished, a K-9 unit arrived and a drug-detection dog was deployed on the outside of 
Round's vehicle where it subsequently alerted to the presence of narcotics. (2/20/2010 
Tr., p.62, Ls.14-17; p.63, L.8 - p.64, L.6.) Officer Christensen's investigation was still 
ongoing when the drug-detection dog arrived. (2/20/2010 Tr., p.49, L.3 - p.50, L.1.) 
Therefore, the investigation was not prolonged by the arrival and deployment of the 
drug-detection dog. 
Round has failed to establish error in the district court's denial of her suppression 
motion. The district court's order denying that motion should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Round's suppression motion. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 2012. 
c~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of June, 2012, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
CR~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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